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RLT: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF
RELIGIOUS LEGAL THEORY AS A
MOVEMENT
SAMUEL J. LEVINE†
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Angela Carmella opened the inaugural Religious
Legal Theory Conference at Seton Hall Law School,1 declaring a
“This is it!” moment.2 This moment brought together dozens of
American legal scholars from across the country to explore ways
in which religious thought might help illuminate law and
legal theory. Drawing upon numerous religious traditions,
participants at the conference addressed a wide range of
substantive, conceptual, and philosophical areas of law. Relying
on perspectives that are sometimes absent from American legal
scholarship, many of these scholars offered new insights into
American legal doctrine and theory.3

†
Professor of Law & Director, Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center. An
earlier version of this Article was presented at the 2010 Religious Legal Theory
Conference: Religion in Law, Law in Religion, hosted by St. John’s University School
of Law and organized by Mark Movsesian and Marc DeGirolami. I thank Mark,
Marc, and the other participants at the conference for helpful conversations.
1
See SETON HALL, Religious Legal Theory: The State of the Field, http://law.
shu.edu/About/News_Events/lawfaithculture/upload/Legal-Theory-Program.pdf (last
visited Sept. 18, 2011).
2
Carmella borrowed this phrase from the title of Michael Jackson’s DVD that
had been released shortly before the conference. See INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
This Is It, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1477715/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
3
A number of the conference presentations were published in a volume of the
Seton Hall Law Review. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, On the Rhetorical Invention of a
Failed Project: A Critical Response to Skeel’s Assessment of Christian Legal
Scholarship, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 971 (2010); John F. Coverdale, The Normative
Justification for Tax Exemption: Elements from Catholic Social Thought, 40 SETON
HALL L. REV. 889 (2010); Michael V. Hernandez, Theism, Realism, and Rawls, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 905 (2010); Samuel J. Levine, Applying Jewish Legal Theory in
the Context of American Law and Legal Scholarship: A Methodological Analysis, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 933 (2010); Mark L. Movsesian, Fiqh and Canons: Reflections
on Islamic and Christian Jurisprudence, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 861 (2010); Amelia
J. Uelmen, Religious Legal Theory’s “Second Wave,” 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 955
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Of course, Religious Legal Theory4—or “RLT”—did not
simply appear or originate at the 2009 conference. Scholars,
including many of those who presented papers at the conference,
have engaged in this form of scholarship for decades.5 Yet,
Carmella’s observation emphasized the importance of the 2009
conference as a point in time in which scholars, who had been
involved in related but largely disparate strands of a distinct
form of scholarship, joined together under a common title with a
broadly unifying theme. In short, RLT had the makings of a
“movement.”
With the success of the second annual Religious Legal
Theory Conference6 at St. John’s University School of Law,7 and
(2010); Robert K. Vischer, When is a Catholic Doing Legal Theory Doing “Catholic
Legal Theory?”, 40 Seton HALL L. REV. 845 (2010).
4
The phrase “Religious Legal Theory” (“RLT”) appears to have been coined by
the organizers of the inaugural conference at Seton Hall Law School. See supra note
1.
5
In fact, Amy Uelmen has suggested that we may already be in a “second wave”
of RLT. See Uelmen, supra note 3, at 957. For collections of some of the scholarship
in this area, see generally CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael
W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001); CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (John
Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008); FAITH AND LAW: HOW RELIGIOUS
TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW AMERICAN LAW (Robert F. Cochran, Jr.
ed., 2008); JEWISH LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (Martin P. Golding ed., 1994); THE
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, & HUMAN NATURE (John
Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006); Colloquium, Can the Ordinary Practice
of Law Be a Religious Calling?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 373 (2005); Symposium, Faith and
the Law, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 911 (1996); Symposium, Law & Politics as Vocation,
20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006); Symposium, Lawyering and
Personal Values, 38 CATH. LAW. 145 (1998); Symposium, Rediscovering the Role of
Religion in the Lives of Lawyers and Those They Represent, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
821 (1999); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer’s Work: An Interfaith
Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998); Symposium, Text, Tradition, and
Reason in Comparative Perspective, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2006); see also Caudill,
supra note 3; Levine, supra note 3; Samuel J. Levine, Emerging Applications of
Jewish Law in American Legal Scholarship: An Introduction, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 43
(2007); Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal
Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127 (2004).
6
The call for papers issued for the St. John’s conference opened with the
description: “[t]his annual symposium, to be shared among different law schools and
now in its second year.” ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY, Call for Papers Religious Legal
Theory Conference: Religion in Law and Law in Religion, http://www.stjohns.edu/
academics/graduate/law/pr_law_100330.news_item@digest.stjohns.edu%2Facademic
s%2Fgraduate%2Flaw%2Fpr_law_100330.xml (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
7
See ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY, Religious Legal Theory Conference, http://
www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/academics/centers/lawreligion/programs/
religious_conference (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
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the forthcoming third annual conference at Pepperdine
University School of Law, it is now appropriate to consider the
extent to which RLT may, in fact, be characterized as a “legal
movement”—or at least an intellectual movement within the
legal academy. In so doing, it may be instructive to look at some
other intellectual movements in American law, providing models
for comparisons and contrasts with some of the salient features
of RLT.
Toward that goal, this Article looks briefly at certain aspects
of Critical Legal Studies, Law and Economics, and Empirical
Legal Studies. For the purposes of this preliminary analysis of
RLT, this Article will adopt somewhat simplified models of these
movements, focusing on some of their central features, including
critiques that have been leveled against them.8 In turn, this
Article will explore similar elements of RLT in an effort to
evaluate the potential status and standing of RLT as a legal
movement.
I.

RLT AND CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

In a list of major legal movements of the past few decades,
Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) would surely emerge as one the
most interesting—perhaps most controversial—as well as,
depending on the observer’s point of view, one of the most
influential. While countless books, articles, and commentaries
have documented and dissected the rise—and apparent demise—
of CLS,9 one of the most notable accounts is found in the

8
Notably, though perhaps not surprisingly, these movements share a number of
characteristics, and have faced similar forms of criticism and opposition. Indeed, it is
not uncommon for movements—particularly, intellectual legal movements—to share
many basic features. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Richard Posner Meets Reb Chaim of
Brisk: A Comparative Study in the Founding of Intellectual Legal Movements, 8 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 95, 105–12 (2006).
9
See generally, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1988); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT
(1986); Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984);
Symposium, Critical Legal Studies, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1985); Symposium,
Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Richard Michael Fischl, The
Question that Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 779 (1992);
Pierre Schlag, Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 295 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009); Pierre Schlag,
Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991); John Henry
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observations offered by Mark Tushnet, a central figure in CLS, in
his 1991 retrospective on the movement.10 Writing on the
“origins of critical legal studies,” Tushnet recalls that:
In early 1976 David Trubek . . . told me that he had spoken with
Duncan Kennedy. They had agreed that there were a number
of people doing academic studies of law that seemed to have
certain common themes, and that it might be useful to gather
these people, and a few others, to see whether that perception
was accurate . . . . If that perception were correct, the thought
was, some sort of organizational locus for that intellectual work
would be useful . . . . [T]he work . . . was being done by people
scattered throughout the country, often with no sense that
anyone other than Kennedy might be interested in it or might
make helpful comments on it. . . . [T]here were people doing
similar work . . . who would want to affiliate with a group of
sympathetic scholars. . . . Even at the start there was some
sense that a relatively formal structure was needed to provide
the location for the academic activities that Trubek had referred
to . . . .11

Tushnet’s description of the formation of CLS probably
shares much with the formation of many movements including,
perhaps, RLT. As a movement, RLT likewise grows out of the
recognition that many scholars have been involved in studies on
the law that seem to share certain common themes. In addition,
much of the work in RLT was similarly taking place in a largely
scattered manner, and many scholars who aimed to apply
religious thought to their intellectual pursuits found themselves
marginalized from the mainstream of American legal
scholarship. In this sense, not unlike Tushnet’s recollection of
the need for a “location” for CLS scholarship, the conferences and
affiliations that revolve around RLT help provide scholars with a
community sympathetic to drawing upon religious ideas for legal
insights.
At the same time, Tushnet refuses to “describe[ ] ‘tenets’ of
[CLS] or dogmas to which one must adhere in order that one’s
Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984).
10
See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J.
1515, 1523–24 (1991).
11
Id. at 1523.
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self-identification with [CLS] be accepted by others who similarly
self-identify.”12 Taking this approach one step further, Tushnet
declares candidly that:
[T]here is something awkward in talking about critical legal
studies as a “movement” or “school.” As I read articles by and
about critical legal studies, I not infrequently find myself
puzzled. The authors of the articles provoking this reaction
describe what they believe critical legal studies to be . . . .
Where the articles are by people whom I regard as coparticipants in the enterprise of critical legal studies . . . [and]
when I find these authors taking as central to their
understanding of [CLS] propositions that I find extremely
problematic, or dismissing as unimportant propositions that I
find central, I have to figure out what is going on.13

Again, Tushnet’s observations may be echoed by some
participants in RLT who may find themselves in strong
disagreement with the work done by others in the field. In fact,
while Tushnet sees the divergence of views in CLS as posing
something of a puzzle, RLT scholarship, by its very nature,
includes positions that will be, in some ways, in fundamental
opposition to one another. Some—if not much—of the work that
helps comprise RLT relies on implicit or express assumptions
about fundamental issues of religious faith not shared by others
in the movement. Following Tushnet’s example, it may therefore
be necessary to consider the validity of labeling RLT a
movement, when many of its apparent proponents disagree on
matters central to the identity of the movement.
For Tushnet, the “most plausible explanation” for the sharp
divergence of views within CLS “is that critical legal studies is a
political location for a group of people on the Left who share the
project of supporting and extending the domain of the Left in the
12

Id. at 1523–24.
Id. at 1516. In the introduction to his Guide to Critical Legal Studies, Mark
Kelman makes a similar observation:
I by no means suggest that I can capture the essence of all the work that
has been done by people who have identified themselves with
[CLS] . . . much less identify the essence of what a “critical theory” of law
might be in a more general sense. Many people associated with the
movement would surely disagree with the substantive ideas I attribute to
Critics generally and even with my view of the meaning of the particular
works I identify as central or definitive.
KELMAN, supra note 9, at 2.
13
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legal academy. On this view the project of critical legal studies
does not have any essential intellectual component . . . .”14
Tushnet explains that:
There are at best family resemblances among various versions
of [intellectual] themes, and, as a matter of intellectual
integrity, adherents of each version will criticize other versions
for their intellectual shortcomings. Yet it turns out that the
existence of the family resemblances may be the most important
dimension of the work.15

Perhaps a similar explanation underlies the potential
viability of RLT as a movement, notwithstanding the differences
among its adherents. One of the primary functions of RLT may
be to provide a “location”—not per se political, but supporting the
intellectual premise that ideas rooted in religious thought can
contribute to our understanding of legal issues, including
American law and legal theory. Indeed, Tushnet’s metaphor of
family resemblance may prove quite apt in the context of RLT,
which is comprised, perhaps most basically, of the work of
scholars who exercise deeply differing modes of religious belief
and expression, but whose intellectual output shares the
characteristic of paying respect and attention to—rather than
marginalizing or ignoring—insights into law based in religious
ideas.
II. RLT AND LAW AND ECONOMICS
Despite the appeal of envisioning RLT as incorporating a
variety of different voices and perspectives, the presence of a
multiplicity of views that claim a central role in RLT may raise
questions about the potential viability of RLT as an identifiable
movement. Here again, it may be worthwhile to look at parallels
in another movement, Law and Economics.

14
15

Tushnet, supra note 10, at 1516.
Id. at 1524.
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Like CLS, and owing, in part, to its nature as an innovative
and ambitious movement, Law and Economics lends itself to
different descriptions and has attracted its share of both
admiration and criticism.16 For the purpose of the present
analysis, it may be helpful to focus again on a simplified model,
this time as depicted by Anita Bernstein in her provocative 2005
article Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?17 Unlike
Tushnet—possibly the ultimate insider to CLS—Bernstein is a
self-identified outsider to Law and Economics. Yet, Bernstein’s
status as an outsider may enable her to uncover and articulate
concerns about Law and Economics that are not as apparent to
those inside the movement.
For example, Bernstein notes that, according to some within
the movement, “law and economics contains multitudes—an
array of literatures, submovements, and schools of thought.”18
Conceding that “[p]erhaps it does,” Bernstein acknowledges that
“[c]ertainly a scholar trained in both economics and law has the
vocabulary to combine the two disciplines in ways that would not
hew to the descriptions of Chicago-style welfare economics, or to
any other fraction of the genre.”19
Still, Bernstein retorts :
[O]bservers with no stake in the cliché about diversity can see
how well it serves insiders, who get from it a basis to say that

16

See generally NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND
FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM (1997); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy Is Dear at
Any Price: A Response to Professor Posner’s Economic Theory, 12 GA. L. REV. 429
(1978); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics
Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1991); Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 245 (1989); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); Leonard R. Jaffee, The Troubles with Law and
Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 777 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36
J.L. & ECON. 385 (1993); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); Arthur Allen Leff, Law and,
87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978); Levine, supra note 8; Francesco Parisi, Palgrave on Law &
Economics: A Review Essay, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 395 (2000).
17
Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV.
303 (2005).
18
Id. at 305.
19
Id.
THE LAW:
ECONOMIC
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their movement is big and a ready retort to semi-disavow
anything in it that provokes criticism: “Well, that’s one of the
other schools.” Law and economics can claim pluralism when
pluralism suits, monolithic unity when pluralism threatens to
splinter its power.20

Continuing in this mode, Bernstein asserts that:
This inclination within the movement to have it both ways
impels me to take a second look at its premise that law and
economics is distinct from all other disciplines yet eclectic and
pluralistic, the academy’s big tent. The two postures are not
only in tension with each other but perhaps also, I start to
suspect, questionable in isolation. For law and economics to be
valid, two conditions must obtain: Law and economics needs a
foundation of meaningful concepts and a boundary to fence out
what it rejects or does not believe. If these two elements are
missing, then its distinctive aspects may be unsound and its
variations, offshoots, and alliances may be incoherent.21

Similar questions can be posed with respect to RLT, which
likewise contains many different approaches to religion, law, and
their combined study.22 These different approaches are premised

20

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 305–06.
22
Again, it is not uncommon to find similar characteristics and critiques
accompanying the development of different legal movements. See, e.g., Levine, supra
note 8. For example, similar to Bernstein’s concerns about Law and Economics,
scholars have raised questions about the status of both Law and Literature and
Empirical Legal Studies (“ELS”) as unified movements.
In a critique of Law and Literature, Jane Baron wrote:
[T]he law-and-literature movement has tended to undermine itself from
within. If there is a single movement here, it is certainly a very fractured
one. The concerns of its separate strands are quite disparate. Any theme
broad enough to tie all the strands together can be found and stated only at
a level of abstraction so high as to threaten banality; such abstraction also
undercuts what some within the movement regard as a fundamental
commitment to particularity as opposed to grand theory. This is a
movement of many methodologies and conclusions. The multiplicity of
approaches and concerns that leads some to see literature as a source of
nearly endless possibilities may lead skeptics to dismiss law and literature
as an empty vessel, a phrase devoid of content.
Jane B. Baron, Essay, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108
YALE L.J. 1059, 1061–62 (1999). More recently, David Zaring offered similar
comments on ELS:
[I]t strikes me that ELS has a number of different constituencies, and the
common cause among them is not always obvious. . . . All of these people, to
varying degrees, show up at [the Conference on ELS], and learn, I think,
21
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on sometimes widely diverging approaches to matters of central
importance to the intellectual, moral, spiritual, and emotional
commitments of the participants in the movement.
This
phenomenon can be understood as an expression of the pluralism
that characterizes RLT as a movement, allowing for different
schools or modes of thought to flourish, without requiring that
participants accept all of the arguments that are offered in the
course of the development and expansion of the movement.
Nevertheless, such a response remains vulnerable to
Bernstein’s challenge to Law and Economics. Insiders to RLT
might embrace the banner of pluralism; the big tent of RLT
enables its participants to take part in a movement with
widespread influence, but at the same time allows them to
disclaim positions within the movement that they do not share on
law, religion, or both. Consistent with Bernstein’s observations,
however, the claim to the status of a movement requires that
RLT retain some form of “monolithic unity.”23 The question,
then, is whether RLT can successfully maintain a position that
seems to try to “have it both ways,”24 or whether participants are
simply choosing to assert either pluralism or unity whenever
convenient,
without
accepting
the
arguably
inherent
contradiction in these positions.
In fact, these concerns may be more pronounced for RLT
than in Bernstein’s description of Law and Economics. First,
although disputes among Law and Economics scholars
from one another, but each of them ask rather different questions, using
rather different methods. It will be interesting to see if the constituencies
start their own conferences in the future, or if [the Conference on ELS] will
continue to serve them all.
David Zaring, Empirical Legal Studies Today, THE CONGLOMERATE (Nov. 23,
2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/11/empirical-legal-studies-today.html;
cf. Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal
Studies and a Response to Concerns 21 (Cornell Legal Studies, Working Paper,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1727538 (“ELS can provide a common
intellectual environment in which scholars from diverse disciplines communicate
and collaborate.”); Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal
Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 557, 560 (2010) (“In truth . . . the ELS movement . . . has no single, canonical
self-definition, and its boundaries remain indistinct.”); id. at 559 (“ELS’s mission
remains only loosely defined.”). For further comparisons between RLT and ELS, see
infra, Part III.
23
Bernstein, supra note 17, at 305.
24
Id.
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sometimes revolve around strongly held—and passionately
argued—positions, disagreements among RLT scholars may, at
times, stem from differences in scholars’ deeply held religious
beliefs and principles, carrying the potential for more
fundamental and unbridgeable forms of division and
divisiveness.
Second, arguments among Law and Economics scholars
typically involve one scholar’s considered evaluation and
rejection of the substance and/or methodology of the work of
another scholar. In contrast, because an RLT scholar’s project
may draw upon a particular—and particularistic—religious
tradition, other RLT scholars may find themselves unable to fully
understand the project. As a result, they may find themselves in
the untenable position of either accepting the project “on faith” as
it were, or rejecting it outright, not based on an evaluation of the
project, but due to the inability to evaluate it.25 Thus, Bernstein’s
25

Jeremy Waldron has applied the concept of “mutual intelligibility” in
evaluating similar concerns over political arguments that rely on religious
principles. See Jeremy Waldron, Two-Way Translation: The Ethics of Engaging with
Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation 16–17 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 10–84, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708113.
Drawing an analogy to arguments that rely on complex understanding of other
disciplines, Waldron concludes that political arguments based on religious ideas
need not be deemed unintelligible to “non-believers.” Id. at 12. As Waldron puts it:
An awful lot of what gets said and what needs to be said in the way of
economics requires people to abandon their intuitive views and do some
patient study, using resources available (though not superficially or easily
available) in the culture. When Paul Krugman talks about the banking
crisis, a certain amount of background learning is necessary to evaluate
what he says.
Id. at 17. Waldron finds a similar option available for those who wish to understand
a religious position. Waldron asserts that:
[I]n the case of religion[,] I don’t believe that the issue is the “can’t” of
unintelligibility; I think the issue is the “won’t” of intellectual refusal.
Many people have resolved to have nothing to do with religious thought,
and standing firm on that resolution, they demand to be spoken to in only
secular terms.
Id. (emphasis omitted). Though not unrelated to the issues confronting RLT,
Waldron’s assertions would not seem to allay concerns about the limits of effective
intellectual dialogue among RLT scholars. First, the analogy between economics and
religious thought may simply fail on epistemological grounds, as some religious
doctrines may be inherently less accessible to outsiders than are many principles of
economic theory.
Second, as a descriptive matter, Waldron appears to conclude that many
outsiders to a religious tradition will reject the need to engage arguments based in
that tradition. Though Waldron criticizes such a response as unjustified, his
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challenge to the status of Law and Economics as a movement—
that it “needs a foundation of meaningful concepts and a
boundary to fence out what it rejects or does not believe”26—may
prove even more of an obstacle to the viability of RLT as a
movement.
As RLT continues to grow, in numbers and influence, it may
be helpful for its proponents to remain cognizant of these issues,
and perhaps to begin to address these concerns. For example, in
formulating a “foundation of meaningful concepts”27 as a unifying
factor, RLT may have to accept the reality that not all
participants in RLT scholarship will have the ability to fully
understand and evaluate the work of others in the movement.
After all, when evaluating other forms of interdisciplinary
scholarship, outsiders to a discipline have to apply a degree of
acceptance of another scholar’s substantive depiction of the
discipline, while at the same time exercising a degree of
independent judgment as to the coherence of the analysis and its
applicability, if any, to American legal thought.
Still, even this dynamic may prove problematic in the
context of RLT. Accepting the substantive presentation of
another scholar’s faith tradition may require not only a limited
suspension of critical thinking on the part of the listener; it may
require a degree of cognitive—or emotional—dissonance for the
listener, who may find fault not with the depiction of the faith
tradition, but with the tradition itself.
In contrast, though some may reject certain applications of
economics, philosophy, or literature to law, this reaction more
likely reflects skepticism about general or specific lessons these
disciplines may have for legal thought, rather than an underlying
rejection of these disciplines on their own terms.28
Ultimately, the willingness of participants in RLT to
embrace, on an intellectual level, a broad range of religious
description may apply to some forms of RLT scholarship as well. To be sure, unlike
the “non-believers” Waldron considers, some RLT scholars, who are themselves
adherents to a faith tradition, may be more willing to engage on an intellectual level
with arguments premised on a different faith tradition. Alternatively, however,
perhaps some believers will be even less likely to intellectually and/or emotionally
engage religious positions that run contrary to their own.
26
Bernstein, supra note 17, at 305–06.
27
Id. at 305.
28
See supra note 22.

WF_Levine (Do Not Delete)

590

1/24/2012 9:43 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:579

traditions, including those very different from one’s own, may
limit the movement’s adherence to Bernstein’s other criterion,
that the movement delineate “a boundary to fence out what it
rejects or does not believe.”29 To the extent that RLT, by its
nature, needs to rely on a big tent approach, the movement will
likely fence out only those projects that are fundamentally
opposed to the principles of RLT. Perhaps RLT will reject
projects that advocate, without explanation, the exclusion of any
reliance on religious argument in the understanding of law
and public policy, or that advocate principles—religious or
otherwise—that are so repugnant as to be deemed outside the
bounds of positions that merit even limited analytical deference.
III. RLT AND EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES
Finally, a preliminary examination of the status and
potential success of RLT as a movement may benefit from looking
at the model of Empirical Legal Studies (“ELS”), which presently
constitutes the fastest growing intellectual legal movement.30
Like many movements, including Law and Economics and CLS,
in addition to attracting adherents, ELS has had a number of
objections leveled against it.31 Brian Leiter has captured one of
the most basic critiques of ELS, claiming that advocates of ELS
have not paid sufficiently critical attention to the volume of work

29

Bernstein, supra note 17, at 305–06.
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 7 (describing the “rapid ascendance” of
ELS that “does have a revolutionary feel to it, enough to startle some observers”); id.
at 20 (observing that ELS “has grown remarkably quickly”); Karen Sloan,
Empiricism Divides the Academy, NAT’L L.J. (Feb. 28, 2011) (“Proponents of this
movement—dubbed empirical legal studies—view it as a major trend in legal
academia.”). See generally Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, WILEY-BLACKWELL,
http://www.wiley.com/bw/journal.asp?ref=1740-1453 (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
31
For discussions of and responses to a number of these objections, see generally
Eisenberg, supra note 22; Sloan, supra note 30; Josh Wright, Empirical Legal
Scholarship, Empirical Legal Scholars, and the Quality of Legal Education: A
Response to Professor Bainbridge, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Mar. 1, 2011),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/03/01/empirical-legal-scholarship-empirical-legalscholars-and-the-quality-of-legal-education-a-response-to-professor-bainbridge/;
“Stephen Bainbridge Disdains the Trend” Towards Empirical Legal Scholarship,
STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE'S J.L. POL. & CULTURE (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.
professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2011/02/ucla-law-professorstephen-bainbridge-disdains-the-trend-towards-empirical-legal-scholarship.html.
30
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that is being produced under the title of ELS.32 Leiter declares
that:
[T]here is the danger that ELS scholars may be on their way to
replicating an aspect of the CLS phenomenon of yesteryear,
namely, forming a self-reinforcing mutual-admiration society,
one which the rest of the legal academy (even we
interdisciplinary-minded
scholars!)
finds
increasingly
mysterious and disconnected from the central normative and
conceptual questions of legal scholarship and legal education.33

Leiter’s observation, whatever its merits with respect to ELS
or, for that matter, CLS, may strike an appropriate note of
caution for proponents of RLT as an emerging movement in the
legal academy. Indeed, the need for such caution in RLT may
prove particularly pressing, given the likelihood that—more than
in other movements—RLT scholars may have to exercise a high
degree of critical restraint in their evaluation of the work of
others in the same field.34 As a result, RLT might experience the
risk of becoming a “self-reinforcing mutual-admiration society”35
in which scholars are overly deferential and overly generous to
the work of others because of an unwillingness or an inability—
or a combination thereof—to critique others’ work, especially
when it is based in a different religious faith or tradition.
Accordingly, Leiter’s assertion that “the rest of the legal
academy . . . finds [ELS] increasingly mysterious”36 may be of
even greater concern for RLT. It is not uncommon for proponents
of RLT to advance the proposition that American law and legal
scholarship unduly—and perhaps improperly—marginalize
religious thought. RLT is intended, in part, to remedy this
failure, exploring the validity and value of projects that rely on
religious tradition for insights into our understanding of
American law and legal thought.
If RLT is perceived by already skeptical outsiders as
applying less rigorous standards, it may have difficulty avoiding

32
See Brian Leiter, On So-Called “Empirical Legal Studies” and Its Problems,
BRIAN LEITER'S L. SCH. REPORTS (July 6, 2010), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/
leiter/2010/07/on-socalled-empirical-legal-studies.html.
33
Id.
34
See supra Part II.
35
See Leiter, supra note 32.
36
Id.
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the accompanying perception that RLT scholars have formed a
mysterious mutual admiration society, with little, if anything, of
value to say to the rest of the legal academy.37 In turn, this
perception will serve to reinforce resistance to projects that draw
upon religious tradition. Because perceptions sometimes have
the tendency to influence and transform reality, and because
RLT seems particularly vulnerable to these critiques and the
underlying perceptions they accompany, it behooves advocates of
RLT as a movement to pay careful attention to these concerns as
the movement continues to develop.
CONCLUSION
Through a preliminary examination of Religious Legal
Theory, this Article suggests that, as RLT continues to realize its
potential as an intellectual legal movement, it will likely
evidence some of the characteristics—and face some of the
challenges—that have accompanied the development of other
legal movements. Drawing upon the experiences of Critical
Legal Studies, Law and Economics, and Empirical Legal Studies,
this Article identifies possible avenues for the future growth of
RLT, while at the same time deriving lessons for the ways RLT
might respond to potential objections and critiques of its status
as a movement.
Specifically, RLT has attracted scholars from a variety of
perspectives, representing diverse, deeply held, and—often—
deeply conflicting approaches to law, religion, and to their
combined study, who unite within a movement that looks to
religious thought for insights to help illuminate our
understanding of law and legal theory. Yet, despite the appeal of

37

This concern also evokes Jeanne Schroeder’s “one-word critique” of Law and
Economics as a “cult.” Bernstein, supra note 17, at 307 (quoting Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147, 150
(2000)). Though Schroeder’s claim was premised on a substantive critique of Law
and Economics, Bernstein notes that, in addition to “clinging to a dogma that gets
reality wrong . . . [cults] are social groups. They contain members who disdain
nonmembers, and who have been known to enjoy thinking that outsiders feel
hostility towards them.” Id. To the extent that RLT is susceptible to suspicion by
those outside the movement, RLT scholars should take care to avoid a sense of
disdain or hostility with respect to nonmembers. In fact, RLT is premised, in part, on
the ambition of relying on religious thought to derive insights into law that can be
appreciated by outsiders to the movement.
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identifying itself through the lens of pluralism, RLT faces the
corresponding challenge of maintaining its status as a cohesive
movement, notwithstanding the deep divisions that might tend to
distance its proponents from one another, both religiously and
intellectually. Accordingly, RLT scholars will have to continue to
work to build a movement that both embraces and responds to
these inherent complexities. Building on its current success,
RLT will have to accept and, when necessary, accord a degree of
deference to differing views, while at the same time incorporating
a degree of independent critical analysis sufficient to maintain
the intellectual rigor and vibrancy of the movement.

